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NOTES
Wyatt v. Cole and Qualified Immunity
for Private Parties in Section 1983 Suits
I.

INTRODUCTION

On March 23, 1871, President Grant asked the Forty-second
Congress to enact emergency legislation to control widespread
violence in the occupied South.' Congress responded with the
Civil Rights Act of 1871.2 The Forty-second Congress, concerned
that lawlessness went unpunished primarily because Ku Klux Klan
sympathizers influenced- state criminal justice systems,' intended to
ameliorate "the insecurity of life and property in the South."4
Section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 is currently codified

1

President Grant warned that:

[a] condition of affairs now exists in some States of the Union rendering life
and property insecure and the carrying of the mails and the collection of the
revenue dangerous. The proof that such a condition of affairs exists in some
localities is now before the Senate. That the power to correct these evils is beyond the control of State authorities I do not doubt; that the power of the
Executive of the United States, acting within the limits of existing laws, is sufficient for the present emergencies is not clear. Therefore, I urgently recommend
such legislation as in the judgment of Congress shall effectually secure life, liberty, and property, and the enforcement of law in all parts of the United States.
CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 244 (1871); see also Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167,

172-73 (1961), overruled by Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
2 Congress established that:
any person who, under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage of any State, shall subject, or cause to be subjected, any person within
the jurisdiction of the United States to the deprivation of any rights, privileges,
or immunities secured by the Constitution of the United States, shall, any such
law, statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of the State to the contrary
notwithstanding, be liable to the party injured in any action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress; such proceeding to be prosecuted in
the several district or circuit courts of the United States ....
Civil Rights Act of 1871, § 1, 17 Stat. 13 (1871).
3 See Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 337 (1983).
4 See District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418, 425 (1973). Congressional testimony documented civil strife by citing acts that included "arson, robbery, whipping,
shootings, murders, and other forms of violence and intimidation-often committed in
disguise and under the cover of night." Briscoe, 460 U.S. at 337.
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at 42 U.S.C. 1983.1 It is the product of three legislative goals:
overriding certain state laws, providing a federal remedy where
state law did not, and providing a federal remedy where the state
remedy, though adequate in theory, was not available in practice.6
The text of the statute confirms the first goal.7 The second and
third goals are documented in the statute's legislative history,
which reflects the era's civil unrest.8 Although commonly known
as the Ku Klux Klan Act,' the name was misleading in the sense
that the legislative history reveals that Congress did not intend to
create a remedy against private parties, such as the Klan, but
against public officials reluctant to enforce remedies already on
the books." Section 1 of the Civil Rights- Act of 1871 was "not a
remedy against [the Klan] or its members but against those who
representing a State in some capacity were unable or unwilling to
enforce a state law."" The Forty-second Congress intended to
create a federal remedy that "prevent[ed] state officials from using
the cloak of their authority under state law to violate rights pro-

5

The statute reads:

Every person, who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes
to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. For the
purposes of this section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988).
6 See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 173-74 (1961), ovenuled by Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
7 Since § 1983 holds liable any person who acts under the color of "any statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any state" and deprives the constitutional
rights of others, it allows federal courts to overturn unconstitutional state laws. See Note,
Limiting the Section 1983 Action in the Wake of Monroe v. Pape, 82 HARv. L. REV. 1486,
1489 (1969).
8 Id.
9 See Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 354 (1979).
10 Id. The 1871 act was titled "An Act to Enforce the Provisions of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, and for other purposes." 17 Stat.
13 (1871); see also MARTIN A. SCH1IARTZ & JOHN E. KIRKLIN, SECTION 1983 LITIGATION:
CLAIMS, DEFENSES, AND FEEs § 1.3 (2d ed. 1991).
11 Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 175-76 (1961), overruled by Monell v. Department
of Social Senv, 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
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tected against state infringement by the Fourteenth Amendment." 2
Congress passed section I of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 "for,
the express purpose of 'enforc[ing] the Provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment."".. Since the Fourteenth Amendment protects individual liberties against state action,' 4 section 1983 addresses only state action. But not all acts undertaken by private
parties fall outside the scope of section 1983. In Lugar v.
Edmondson Oil Company,'5 the Supreme Court held that private
defendants who relied on an attachment statute later found to
violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
engaged in state action because their acts were "fairly attributable
to the state." 6 The Court left open the crucial question of whether these private defendants were protected by the qualified immunity extended to public officials who reasonably relied on such
statutes. 7
The courts of appeals have split into three camps over the
extension of qualified immunity to private defendants. The
Fifth,"
Eighth, 9 Tenth,"
and Eleventh2'
Circuits
have
extended qualified immunity to private parties. The First23 and

12 Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 948 (1982) (Powell, J., dissenting)
(interpreting Monroe v. Pape).
13 17 Star. 13 (1871).
14 "[A]ction inhibited by the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment is only
such action as may fairly be said to be that of the States." Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S.
1, 13 (1948). "That Amendment erects no shield against merely private conduct, however
discriminatory or wrongful." Id.
15 457 U.S. 922 (1982).
16 Id. at 937. The Court considered that any act satisfying the state action requirement simultaneously met the under color of law requirement in § 1983 actions. Id. at
935. Private acts are fairly attributable if, first, the deprivation was a result of "the exercise of some right or privilege created by the State or by a rule of conduct imposed by
the State or by a person for whom the State is responsible" and if, second, the private
party "acted together with or . . . obtained significant aid from state officials." Id. at 937.
17 Id. at 942 n.23.
18 Folsom Inv. Co. v. Moore, 681 F.2d 1032, 1037 (5th Cir. Unit A 1982) (extending
good-faith immunity to private defendants).
19 Buller v. Buechler, 706 F.2d 844, 850-52 (8th Cir. 1983).
20 DeVargas v. Mason & Hanger-Silas Mason Co., 844 F.2d 714 (10th Cir. 1988), cert.
denied, 498 U.S. 107 (1991).
21 Jones v. Preuit & Mauldin, 851 F.2d 1321, 1323-25 (11th Cir. 1988) (en banc),
vacated on other grounds, 489 U.S. 1002 (1989).
22 See generally Allison Hartwell Eid, Note, Private Party Immunities to Section 1983 Suits,
57 U. CH L. REv. 1323 (1990).
23 Downs v. Sawtelle. 574 F.2d 1, 15-16 (1st Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Hagan v.
Downs, 439 U.S. 910 (1978).
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Ninth" Circuits have denied qualified immunity to individuals
under certain circumstances. The Sixth Circuit has rejected qualified immunity, which it also terms good-faith immunity, while
allowing a good-faith affirmative defense.25 The Second, Third,
Fourth, Seventh, and D.C. Circuits have not addressed the issue.
The Supreme Court recently addressed the private-party immunity issue in Wyatt v. Cole." This Note analyzes some of the
issues left unresolved by the decision and how these problems
resurface in federal judges' disparate and often divergent responses to Wyatt." Part II traces the development of and relationship
between public-official immunity and private-party immunity before
Wyatt. Parts III and IV review and critique the Wyatt decision. Part
V examines the circuit split that has resurfaced since the Court
decided Wyatt. Part VI concludes that the resurgent split among
the circuits would be best resolved by extending to private parties
the qualified immunity defined in Wood v. Strickland.28
II.

THE ROAD TO WYATT

This Note discusses three means to avoid liability under section 1983: absolute immunity, qualified immunity, and a good
faith defense. Denials of immunity are subject to interlocutory
appeal.29 In theory, post-Harlow immunity claims are assessed before trial against objective standards,"° although this may not be

24 Howerton v. Gabica, 708 F.2d 380, 385 n.10 (9th Cir. 1983) (asserting "there is
no good faith immunity under section 1983 for private parties"). But see Thorne v. City
of El Segundo, 802 F.2d 1131, 1140 n.8 (9th Cir. 1986) (retreating from the absolute
Howerton position). See also Conner v. City of Santa Ana, 897 F.2d 1487, 1489 n.9 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 816 (1990).
25 Duncan v. Peck, 844 F.2d 1261 (6th Cir. 1988). Until Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457
U.S. 800 (1982), the affirmative defense of good faith and probable cause was known
interchangeably as "qualified immunity." It had to be pled and proven by the accused
and was, in a sense, no immunity at all. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 815 (citing Gomez v. Toledo. 446 U.S. 635 (1980)).
The Sixth Circuit interpreted footnote 23 in Lugar, which left open the possibility
of a good faith defense, as "offer[ing] the possibility of some sort of defense from liability for private individuals, and does not necessarily suggest the specific defense of immunity." Duncan, 844 F.2d at 1265.
26 112 S. Ct. 1827 (1992).
27 See generally David Lagos, Note, Damned if You Do .. . The Supreme Court Denies
Qualified Immunity to Section 1983 Private Party Defendants in Wyatt v. Cole, 71 N. CAR. L.
REV. 849 (1993).
28 420 U.S. 308 (1975).
29 ERWIN CHEMERINSKY. FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 8.6.3 (Supp. 1992).
30 See. e.g., Hunter v. Bryant, 112 S. Ct. 534 (1991); Siegert v. Gilley, 111 S. Ct.
1789 <1991); CHEMERINSKY, supra note 29, § 8.6.3.
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true in practice. Absolute immunity requires the defendant only to
invoke his status and establish that the acts in question fall within
the scope of that status.3 The presence or absence of malice is
irrelevant. Qualified immunity is an affirmative defense, the extent
of which depends on the scope of authority vested in the public
official being sued. 2 The good faith defense is alluded to by the
Wyatt majority. Like qualified immunity, it must be pled and
proven by the defendant. Unlike qualified immunity, however, it
may be appealable only after adjudication on the merits."3 The
good faith defense emphasizes a subjective inquiry into the state
of mind of the accused. The exact contours of the defense remain
uncertain, but the idea appears to command at least five votes on
the Court.'
The Supreme Court's denial of qualified immunity to private
parties in Wyatt v. Coe has its roots in two lines of cases. The first
line of cases documents how the Supreme Court insulates all public officials from their discretionary acts by extending some form
of immunity from liability under section 1983. The second line
depends upon the first, analogizing that we should extend publicofficial immunity to private parties who qualify as state actors by
cooperating with government officials.
A.

Immunity for Public Officials

This first line of cases can be viewed as an attempt to reconcile the public good which results from an unfettered exercise of
discretion by public officials with the equitable notion that one
should be held accountable for his acts.
In Tenney v. Brandhove, 5 the Supreme Court extended absolute immunity to legislators who act within the scope of legitimate
legislative activity. Brandhove filed his action after he was sanctioned for refusing to testify before the California Senate Fact-

31 See Brandhove v. Tenney, 341 U.S. 367, 376-79 (1951); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424
U.S. 409 (1976).
32 See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 248-49 (1974). "Qualified or 'good faith'
immunity is an affirmative defense that must, be pleaded by a defendant official." Harlow
v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 815 (1982) (quoting Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635 (1980)).
33 See Wyatt v. Cole, 112 S. Ct. 1827, 1839 (1992) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
34 Justices Kennedy and Scalia endorse the idea. Id. at 1837. Justices Thomas,
Souter, and Rehnquist dissented, advocating the extension of qualified immunity. Id.
35 341 U.S. 367 (1951).
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Finding Committee on Un-American Activities. 36 Although the district court dismissed the complaint without an opinion, the Ninth
Circuit, finding that Brandhove stated a cause of action, reversed." The Supreme Court then reinstated the district court
decision.
Justice Frankfurter, writing for the majority, required defendants who request absolute immunity first to establish their status
as legislators, and second to demonstrate that the act in question
was within "the sphere of legitimate legislative activity."38 After
considering both history and public policy, the Court concluded
that the investigative hearings conducted by the Committee on
Un-American

Activities

were

legitimate

legislative

acts. 3 9

The

Court's policy arguments focused on advancing the public good by
preserving the vigorous exercise of discretion by public officials.4"
When conducting its historical inquiry, the Court marshalled support from the Speech and Debate Clause, state constitutions, and
English common law.4 It did not rely on the legislative history of
the Civil Rights Act of 1871, which contained no mention of immunity and, therefore, offered no help. This method of evaluating
immunity *claims by examining history and public policy was. passed
on to the Wyatt Court.42

36 William Brandhove brought suit under the predecessors to sections 1983 and
1985(3), 8 U.S.C. § 43 (1946) (current. version at 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988)). He sued the
California Senate Fact-Finding Committee on Un-American Activities and its chairman,
Jack B. Tenney, alleging that the committee abused its legislative power and violated his
civil rights in retaliation for his refusal to testify before it. 341 U.S. at 370-71.
37 Brandhove v. Tenney, 183 F.2d 121 (9th Cir. 1950), rev'd, 341 U.S. 367 (1951).
38 341 U.S. at 376. Cf Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976) (limiting the absolute immunity given prosecutors to activities intimately associated with the judicial phase
of the criminal process).
39 341 U.S. at 376-79.
40 The Court drew upon founding father James Wilson, a draftsman of the Speech
and Debate Clause:
[i]n order to enable and encourage a representative of the public to discharge
his public trust with firmness and success, it is indispensably necessary, that he
should enjoy the fullest liberty of speech, and that he should be protected from
the resentment of every one, however powerful, to whom the exercise of that
liberty may occasion offense.
Id. at 373 (quoting II WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 38 (Andrews ed. 1896)). This "chilling
effect" argument resurfaces in later cases.
41 Id. at 373-76.
42 One quarter century later, the Supreme Court stated that Tenney "established that
Section 1983 [should] be read in harmony with general principles of [common-law] immunities and defenses rather than in derogation of them." Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S.
409, 418 (1976). See Wyatt v. Cole, 112 S. Ct. 1827. 1831 (1992).
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The absence of debates by Congress concerning immunity
while enacting the Civil Rights Act of 1871 led the Tenney Court
to rely on other historical sources. The broad issue of personhood
was before the Court in Monroe v. Pape," allowing it to lean upon
the legislative history to support its conclusions. The Court further
relied on legislative history in an immunity case, Pierson v. Ray,'
which grew out of the Freedom Rides that galvanized the nation
in the spring of 1961." The Court granted absolute immunity to
judges exercising discretion within the scope of the judicial process, 6 while holding that the police officers accused of violating
section 1983 merited only the affirmative defense of good faith
and probable cause available to them at common law.47 When
faced with the silence from the Forty-second Congress on immunity, the Pierson Court did not turn to other sources, as it had in
Tenney. Instead, it enlisted the aid of the mute legislative history,
stating that "we presume that Congress would have specifically so
provided had it wished to abolish the [common law] doctrine" of

43 365 U.S. 167 (1961), overruled by Monell v. Department of Social Serv., 436 U.S.
658 (1978).
44 386 U.S. 547 (1967), modified, Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982).
45 After Robert L. Pierson and 14 other Episcopal ministers used segregated facilities
at an interstate bus terminal, three policemen arrested and a police justice convicted the
clergymen of congregating in a public place and threatening a breach of the peace in
violation of Mississippi Code § 2087.5 (1942). 386 U.S. at 549-50. After their convictions
were either overturned or dismissed, the ministers brought a § 1983 suit in the United
States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi, alleging false imprisonment
and human rights violations on the part of police captain (later deputy chief) J.L. Ray,
officers Griffith and Nichols, and Police Justice and Ex-Officio Justice of the Peace
Spencer. Pierson v. Ray, 352 F.2d 213 (5th Cir. 1965), cert. granted, 384 U.S. 938 (1966),
affid in part and rev'd in part, 386 U.S. 547 (1967).
After the jury found for the respondents, the Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded
because of prejudicial error. Speaking for the majority, Circuit Judge Blackmun dismissed
Spencer as immune from acts within the scope of judicial duty. Id. at 217. While acknowledging that the defense of good faith and probable cause was available to police
accused of false arrest and imprisonment at common law, the court interpreted Monroe
v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961), to "necessarily impl[y] rejection of such a defense." 352
F.2d at 218.
46 The Pierson majority stressed public policy, explaining that absolute judicial immunity was "not for the protection or benefit of a malicious or corrupt judge, but for the
public, whose interest it is that the judges should be at liberty to exercise their functions
with independence and without fear of consequences." 386 U.S. at 554.
47 The Supreme Court held that the affirmative defense of good faith and probable
cause applies to police officers in § 1983 actions. Id. at 557. Although it recognized that
"[t]he common law has never granted police officers an absolute and unqualified immunity," the Court warned against placing any officer in a position where "he must choose
between being charged with dereliction of duty if he does not arrest when he has
probable cause, and being mulcted in damages if he does." Id. at 555.
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absolute judicial immunity." Once the Court equated Congressional silence with an endorsement of common law immunities, it
looked again to the common law to assess immunity for the police
defendants.4 9
The Court retained "the defense of good faith and probable
cause" available at common law to police officers in false imprisonment claims." First, the Court must have meant good faith or
probable cause, since any other reading would expose officers to
civil liability every time a court invalidated an arrest for lack of
probable cause. Second, while it spoke in terms of defenses, the
Court actually conferred a qualified immunity requiring the absence of malice. The officers would be exonerated at trial if they
could convince the fact-finder that the arrests were either constitutional or that the officers thought they were at the time.5 Had
the officers asserted either that the statute was constitutional or
that no reasonable jurors could disagree that it was constitutional,
their qualified immunity claim would be reduced to questions of
law, and the matter could have been resolved on a motion for
summary judgment.
After Pierson established absolute and qualified immunity as
the two means of avoiding liability, the task of classifying which
public officials merited what level of protection began. Highlevel state executives secured qualified immunity in Scheuer v.
Rhodes,53 in which the Governor of Ohio and the Adjutant Gener-

48 Id.
49 Id. at 556 (quoting Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187 (1961), overruLed ly Monell
v. Department of Social Serv.. 436 U.S. 658 (1978)).
Common law traditions need not circumscribe modem civil rights standards. Under
the common law, police officers who, with probable cause, arrest a suspect who is later
acquitted, are protected from liability in a false arrest suits. Pierson expanded this protection to officers who reasonably rely in good faith on a valid law which was later held
unconstitutional. See Laura Oren, Immunity and Accountability in Civil Rights Litigation: Who
Should Pay, 50 U. Prrr. L. REV. 935, 947 n.48 (1989).
50 386 U.S. at 567.
51 Id. at 557.
52 See, e.g., Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731 (1982) (recognizing absolute immunity
for the President); Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978) (conferring absolute immunity
to prosecutors for acts within the scope of their discretion); Stump -. Sparkman, 435
U.S. 349 (1978) (limiting absolute judicial immunity to official judicial acts within statutory jurisdiction); Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606 (1972) (conferring absolute immunity to Senate aides when the conduct in question would be a protected legislative act if
performed by a Senator).
53 416 U.S. 232 (1974). After the Ohio national guard shot and killed four students
at Kent State University in May 1970, estate representatives for three of the deceased
filed a § 1983 suit against James Rhodes, who was the Governor of Ohio and Adjutant
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al of the Ohio National Guard were sued for their involvement in
the Kent State shootings. The Scheuer Court denied absolute immunity to high-level state executives who "carry a badge of authority
of a State,"54 since any other result would erode section 1983 and
the Supremacy Clause by conferring to executive commands "the
quality of a supreme and unchangeable edict, overriding all conflicting rights of property and unreviewable through the judicial
power of the federal government."5 5 The Court stated that the
objective and subjective elements of qualified immunity protected
state executives
in varying scope ....

the variations being dependent upon the

scope of discretion and responsibilities of the office and all the
circumstances as they reasonably appeared at the time of the
action on which liability is sought to be based. It is the existence of reasonable grounds for the belief formed at the time
and in light of all the circumstances, coupled with good-faith
belief, that affords a basis for qualified immunity of executive
officers for acts performed in the course of official conduct.56

-

This functional approach established an objective standard for
state executives more involved than the probable cause requirement applicable to the police officers in Pierson. It allows the inference that all officials merit some form of immunity in the absence
of malice. 7
Federal judges continued to apply qualified immunity unevenly after Scheuer. This discord persisted in part because the Supreme
Court did not tie the relevance of legal knowledge to the good
faith standard. While federal courts recognized the existence of a
"good faith" immunity, they "either emphasized different factors as
elements of good faith or [did] not give[] specific content to the

General of the Ohio National Guard, various National Guardsmen, and the president of
Kent State University. Krause v. Rhodes, 471 F.2d 430, 433 (6th Cir. 1972), cert. granted,
413 U.S. 919 (1973), revd. 416 U.S. 232 (1974).
The district court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction under the l1th Amendment, and
the Sixth Circuit affirmed. Id. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, extending
qualified immunity to executive officers. 416 U.S. at 243-46.
64 The Civil Rights Act of 1871 was enacted "to enforce provisions of the Fourteenth
Amendment against those who carry a badge of authority of a State and represent it in
some capacity." Id. at 243 (quoting Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 172 (1961)). See infra
Part IV.A.2 (discussing the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment).
55 416 U.S. at 248 (quoting Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U.S. 378, 397 (1932)).
56 Id. at 248-49.
57 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 29, § 8.6.1.
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good-faith standard.""8
Justice White elaborated on the objective component of qualified immunity in Wood v. Strickland.9 This ease arose after three
high school students were expelled for spiking the punch with
malt liquor at a school sponsored event.' The students brought a
section 1983 action against school-board members and administrators, both individually and in their official capacities, alleging that
the defendants acted with malice to violate due process guarantees. 6' The district court instructed the jury that they must find
malice in order to convict,6 2 then dismissed the hung jury, declared a mistrial, and granted defendants' motions for a directed
verdict. 3 The Eighth Circuit remanded, holding that plaintiffs
need only prove the absence of good faith under an objective
standard.64
The Supreme Court vacated the Eighth Circuit decision and
remanded. After acknowledging the qualified good-faith immunity afforded school-board members at common law,' the Court
stated that "ignorance or disregard of settled, indisputable law" fell
short of good faith, which required a working "knowledge of

58 Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 315 (1975).
59 420 U.S. 308 (1975).
60 The students were expelled from Mena Public High School for the remainder of
the semester under a mandatory school-board rule that precluded discretion. Strickland v.
Inlow. 348 F. Supp. 244, 245-46 (W.D. Ark. 1972), 485 F.2d 186, 187 (8th Cir. 1973),
cert. granted, 416 U.S. 935 (1974), vacated, 420 U.S. 308 (1975).
61 348 F. Supp. at 246.
62 Id. at 248.
63 Id. at 247, 254.
64 485 F.2d at 191.
65 Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 321, 327 (1975). The Court denied qualified
immunity to school-board officers who
reasonably knew or should have known that the action he took within his
sphere of official responsibility would violate the constitutional rights of the
[plaintiff], or if he took the action with the malicious intention to cause a deprivation of constitutional rights or other injury to the student.
Id. at 322.
66 Id. at 318. "[S]tate courts have generally recognized that such officers should be
protected from tort liability under state law for all good-faith nonmalicious action taken
to fulfill their official duties." Id.
The theme arguing that public officials need to be free to exercise discretion within
the scope of their authority resurfaced, along with the notion that law should not discourage the best and brightest from entering public service. Id. at 319-20.
67 Id. at 321-22.
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the basic, unquestioned constitutional rights. " s It coupled the
good faith standard with a subjective inquiry to determine if a
school-board member "took the action with the malicious intention to cause deprivation of constitutional rights or other injury to
the student."6 9
Seven years later, a pro-defendant Supreme Court curtailed
the subjective element of qualified immunity in Harlow v.
Fitzgerald.v0 After Fitzgerald was fired from his cabinet-level position as Counselor to the President,"' he filed suit alleging that he
was wrongfully discharged from the Air Force by White House
aides Bryce Harlow and Alexander Butterfield in retaliation for
whistleblowing.72 The aides claimed that absolute immunity derived from the Presidential immunity. How'ever, the Court granted
only qualified "good faith" immunity,7' in part because federal
officials merited no more insulation from liability than their state

68 Id. at 322. The Court awakened echoes of Monroe, arguing that "any lesser standard would deny much of the promise of § 1983." Id.
In dissent, Justice Powell criticized the majority view imposing a duty to know settled and indisputable laws, arguing that often lawyers and legal scholars have difficulty
describing "unquestioned" constitutional rights. Id. at 329. His arguments may not have
considered that school officials have access to legal advice, the costs of which are usually
and properly borne by taxpayers who have an important interest in the efficient and
lawful conduct of their schools. See SHELDON H. NAHMOD, CIVIL RIGHTS AND CIIL LIBERTIES LITIGATION: THE LAM' OF SECTION 1983 § 8.02, at 452 n.14 (2d ed. 1986); see also
Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 595 (1975) (holding that procedural due process guarantees
apply to short-term student suspensions).
69 420 U.S. at 322.
70 457 U.S. 800 (1982). See, e.g., Wyatt v. Cole, 112 S. Ct. 1827, 1832 (1992) (stating
that Harlow "completely reformulated qualified immunity along principles not at all embodied in the common law") (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 645 (1987));
Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985) (holding denials of qualified immunity
immediately appealable because Harlow established an immunity from suit rather than a
mere defense to a liability).
71 457 U.S. at 802 n.1.
72 Id. at 802-05. The relevant facts are shared with Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731
(1981), which conferred absolute immunity upon the President in the absence of contrary congressional acts. Id. at 749-50.
73 457 U.S. at 813-14. Four years earlier, in Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978),
the Court dismissed the Secretary of Agriculture's claim to absolute immunity, leaving
only the affirmative defense of good-faith immunity to "encourag[e] the vigorous exercise
of official authority." Id. at 506.
No statutory claims were before the Court in Harlow when it stated that "Presidential aides, like Members of the Cabinet, generally are entitled only a qualified immunity."
Harlow, 457 U.S. at 809. The conclusion relied heavily on the unanimous conclusion of
the Federal Courts of Appeals that "federal officials should receive no greater protection
from constitutional claims than their counterparts in state government." Butz, 438 U.S. at
498.
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counterparts.74
The Harlow majority focused on the absence of safeguards to
prevent insubstantial civil-rights claims from proceeding to trial.7 5
The Court expressed concern that unsubstantiated claims would
stifle public officials, upon whom the public depended to exercise
discretion. The costs to the judiciary and the public of retaining
subjective criteria for qualified immunity were considered prohibitive.76 This point of view produced a Court that viewed qualified
immunity through a single objective lens.
The Court also treated public officials better than private
parties by excusing from liability public officials who failed to
meet the objective standard but pleaded "extraordinary circumstances" under which they "neither knew or should have known of
the relevant legal standard."77 This disparate treatment undermined the fiction by which the Court considers private parties to
be state actors because it treats differently what are alleged to be
functional equivalents. These changes, made in the name of efficiency, also blurred the distinction between those who manipulate
statutes and those who rely upon them.
As it turned out, this distinction need not have been clouded.
The Supreme Court solved the "vigorous exercise of discretion"
problem four years later in Celotex Corporation v. Catrett.7' The

74 Harlow, 457 U.S. at 809 (citing Butz, 438 U.S. at 504).
75 The Court recognized that summary judgment may not remedy insubstantial civil
rights suits because courts had treated an official's subjective good faith, in many cases,
as a question of fact. Id. at 816. See also Butz, 438 U.S. at 507-08 (promising that federal
executives relying upon qualified immunity can also seek haven from frivolous litigation
through summary judgment).
An increased willingness to affirm grants of summary judgment has ameliorated the
unsupported claims problem by culling unsubstantiated allegations of subjective bad faith
in the earliest stages of litigation. See Wyatt v. Cole, 112 S. Ct. at 1835 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett. 477 U.S. 317. 322 (1986)).
76 The Court asserted that:
substantial costs attend the litigation of the subjective good faith of government
officials . . . the general costs of subjecting officials to the risks of trial-distraction of officials from their governmental duties, inhibition of discretionary action, and deterrence of able people from public service . . . . Judicial
inquiry into subjective motivation therefore may entail broadranging discovery
and the deposing of numerous persons. including an official's professional colleagues. Inquiries of this kind can be particularly disruptive to effective government.
457 U.S. at 816-17.
77 Id. at 819.
78 477 U.S. 317 (1986), remanded sub nom. Catrett v. Johns-Mansville Sales Corp., 826
F.2d 33 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1066 (1988).
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Celotex decision rendered objective qualified immunity obsolete.
The Court ruled that summary judgments were a proper remedy
whenever the defendant's state of mind was at issue. It held summary judgment appropriate against any "party who fails to make a
showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the
burden of proof at trial."79 The Court decided Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc.8" the same year as Celotex. In Anderson, the Court stated
that the nonmoving party "may not rest upon mere allegation or
denials of his pleadings, but must set forth specific facts showing
that there is a genuine issue for trial."'" When taken in concert,
Celotex and Anderson protect official discretion without losing focus
on the difference between reliance on laws and manipulation of
them.
B.

Immunity for Private Parties

All section 1983 suits must clear the state action hurdle because Congress enacted the statute to enforce the Fourteenth
Amendment, which limits only state action.82 But the state action
requirement does not exempt all private parties from liability under section 1983. This section reviews how the courts include
within the scope of section 1983 private parties who actively conspire with government officials. It then documents how the Court
abandoned the active conspiracy requirement in Lugar v.
Edmondson Oil Company.'8 Finally, this section argues that after the
Court committed itself to the fiction of treating private parties like
state actors because they acted like state actors, it could not abandon the active conspiracy requirement without yielding uneven
results.
In 1966, the Supreme Court stated that "[iln cases under §
1983, 'under color' of law has consistently been treated as the
same thing as the 'state action' required under the Fourteenth
Amendment."8 4 It further stated that "[t]o act 'under color' of
law does not require that the accused be an officer of the State. It
is enough that he is a willful participant in joint activity with the

79 Id. at 322.
80 .477 U.S. 242 (1986).
81 Id. at 256.
82 See supra note 14.
83 457 U.S. 922 (1982).
84 United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 794 n.7 (1966).
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State or its agents. " 85

Ninety-nine years after the enactment of the Civil Rights Act
of 1871, the Supreme Court stated explicitly for the first time that
private parties could act under color of law.86 The Adickes case
arose after Freedom School teacher Sandra Adickes was refused
service at an S.H. Kress lunch counter in Hattiesburg, Mississippi,
allegedly because she tried to eat with black students.8 7 The Supreme Court reversed the summary dismissals below and remanded.' The Court reasoned that Adickes could state a section 1983
claim against Kress by showing the "existence of state-enforced custom of segregati[on and] . . . that Kress' refusal to serve her was

motivated by that state-enforced custom."89 The Adickes Court
saved for another day "whether there are any defenses available to
[private persons] in § 1983 actions.""
In Dennis v. Sparks,9 the Court expanded the active conspiracy category to include private citizens who bribed judges. After affirming the absolute civil immunity afforded judges,92 the Court
held that the individuals who bribe judges act under color of law
93
and merit no immunity

85 Id. at 794.
86 Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970).
87 Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 252 F. Supp. 140, 146-47 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), aft'd,
409
F.2d 121 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. granted, 394 U.S. 1011 (1969), rev'd, 398 U.S. 144 (1970).
Adickes was arrested for vagrancy immediately after leaving the lunch counter. Id. at 142.
After she brought suit under sections 1983 and 2000a, the district court ruled for
Kress because of Adickes' failure to prove that Hattiesburg harbored an official custom
favoring the refusal of service to whites who accompanied blacks. Id. The court of appeals affirmed. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 409 F.2d 121 (2d Cir. 1968), rev'd, 398 U.S.
144 (1970).
88 398 U.S. at 174.
89 Id. at 174-75.
90 Id. at 174 n.44.
91 449 U.S. 24 (1980).
92 Id. at 27 (citing Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967)). Corrupt judges may, of
course, still face criminal prosecution. See O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488. 503 (1974),
vacated, 414 U.S. 514 (1976).
The Supreme Court followed the tradition, stretching back at least three decades to
Tenney, of considering "[the immunities of state officials that we have recognized for the
purposes of § 1983 are the equivalents of those that were recognized at common law."
449 U.S. at 29 (citing Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622 (1980)). The Court
also relied a familiar public-policy argument:
U]udicial immunity arose because it was in the public interest to have judges
who were at liberty to exercise their independent judgment about the merits of
the case without fear of being mulcted for damages.
Id. at 31. This idea resurfaces in Wy5att.
93 Id. at 27-28.
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In Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Company,94 the Supreme Court
abandoned the active conspiracy requirement. Here, instead of an
active conspiracy between private individuals and public officials,
the Court dealt with a single company that invoked an attachment
statute later judged unconstitutional.9 5 The Supreme Court ruled
that the act of applying for the writ of attachment rose to the
level of state action," allowing Edmondson Oil to be treated as if
it was a state actor.
The Forty-second Congress may have recognized the difference between filling out forms in good faith and either bribing a
judge or conspiring with police to deny constitutional rights. Justice Powell saw this and, in his dissent, argued for protecting private individuals who "invoke a presumptively valid judicial process
in pursuit only of legitimate private ends."9" Although the Court
mentioned the private-party immunity issue, it left the matter unresolved, declining to consider whether private parties deserved

94 457 U.S. 922 (1982). After Edmondson Oil Company attached his property without bond and prior to judgment, debtor Giles Lugar brought this § 1983 action with
pendant malicious prosecution claims, alleging that the creditor company acted jointly
with the state to deprive him of his property without due process of law. Lugar v.
Edmondson Oil Co., 639 F.2d 1058, 1061 (4th Cir. 1981), cert.
granted, 452 U.S. 937
(1981), affd in part and reuld in part, 457 U.S. 922 (1982). The district court failed to
find state action and summarily dismissed the suit. Id. Although the Fourth Circuit found
that state action was present, it did not think that the invocation of the attachment statute by Edmondson Oil, in and of itself, amounted to acting "under color of law." Id. at
1067-68. Accordingly, the court affirmed the grant of summary judgment below. Id. at
1069-70.
After granting certiorari, the Supreme Court clarified that the requirements of both
state action and under color of law were identical for § 1983 suits brought against state
officials. Lugar. 457 U.S. at 928 (citing Pice, 383 U.S. at 794 n.7); see also CHESTER J.
ANTINEAU, 1 FEDERAL CML RIGHTS ACTS § 56 (2d ed. 1980). The Court held that Lugar
stated a cause of action under § 1983 insofar as he challenged the constitutionality of
the Virginia prejudgment attachment statute, but did not meet state action in alleging
abuse under the statute. Id. at 942. The court reasoned that "[c]areful adherence to the
'state action' requirement preserves an area of individual freedom by limiting the reach
of federal law and federal juridical power." Id. at 936.
95 See Eid, supra note 22, at 1329-30 (discussing the relaxation of the active conspiracy requirement).
96 Lugar, 457 U.S. at 941.
97 Id. at 948 (Powell, J.,dissenting). Justice Powell found it "implausible" that "filing
a petition in state court, in the effort to secure payment of a private debt." amounted to
state action. Id. at 946. He argued for separate inquiries into state action and under color of law.
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common-law immunities under section 1983.98 Ten years later,
the issue resurfaced in Wyatt v. Cole."
III.

THE WYATT DECISION

Howard Wyatt and William Cole were partners in a cattle
business that soured. After their partnership collapsed, Cole filed a
complaint in replevin against Wyatt for a tractor and twenty-four
cattle, and also posted bond."° A deputy to the clerk of court
issued a writ of replevin; a Mississippi circuit court judge ordered
execution; and a sheriff seized the property. The writ was served
on Wyatt the day after seizure. Two months later, the same judge
entered an order dismissing the writ, affirmed the bond, and ordered Cole to restore Wyatt's property or provide restitution.'
Wyatt filed a section 1983 action in the Southern District of
Mississippi against Cole, his attorney, various state officials, and the
officers who seized the contested property. The district court held
that Mississippi's replevin under bond statute..2 violated the Due

98 In response to Justice Powell's dissent, the majority hinted at the possibility of
qualified immunity:
this problem should be dealt with not by changing the character of the cause of
action but by establishing an affirmative defense. A similar concern is at least
partially responsible for the availability of a good faith defense, or qualified
immunity, to state officials. We need not reach the question of the availability of
such a defense to private individuals at this juncture.
Id. at 942 n.23.
The majority backed away, just as it had in Adicke.
We intimate no views concerning the relief that might be appropriate if a violation is shown ....
Nor do we mean to determine at this juncture whether
there are any defenses available to defendants in § 1983 actions like the one at
hand.
Id. (quoting Adickes, 398 U.S. at 174 n.44).
99 112 S. Ct. 1827 (1992). The lower courts in both Lugar and Wyatt had concerned
themselves only with examining motions for summary judgment. Since the Supreme
Court granted certiorari before any court had adjudicated the merits of the case, liability
had not been established, and discussion of appropriate remedies remained unripe.
100 Wyatt v. Cole, 710 F. Supp. 180. 181 (S.D. Miss. 1989), red per curiam, 928 F.2d
718 (5th Cir.), cert. granted, 112 S. Ct. 47 (1991), rev'd, 112 S. Ct. 1827 (1992), remand,
994 F.2d 1113 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 470 (1993).
101 Wyatt v. Cole, 928 F.2d 718, 720 (5th Cir. 1991).
102 Under Mississippi's replevin under bond statute:
[i]f any person, his agent or attorney, shall file a declaration under oath setting
forth:
(a) [a] description of any personal property;
(b) [t]he value, thereof, giving the value of each separate article and the value
of the total of all articles;
(c) [t]he plaintiff is entitled to the immediate possession thereof, setting forth
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Process Clause because it precluded the exercise of judicial discretion prior to seizure. 10 3 The Court granted Wyatt's motion for
summary judgment as to the declaration that the statute was unconstitutional.0 4 In keeping with the Fifth Circuit rule granting
to private defendants the good-faith affirmative defense version of
"qualified immunity,"'
the Court directed Cole to "present
0 6
memoranda containing any pertinent defenses."s

Wyatt appealed, 07 seeking damages from Cole and Robbins,
and attorney's fees from private defendants and the state of Mississippi. O8 Like the district court, the Fifth Circuit spoke in terms
of an affirmative good faith defense but treated the issue as a
question of law."° It focused on the "important public interest in
permitting ordinary citizens to rely on presumptively valid state

all facts and circumstances upon which the plaintiff relies for his claim, and
exhibiting all contracts and documents evidencing his claim;
(d) [t]hat the property is in the possession of the defendant; and
(e) [t]hat the defendant wrongfully took and detains or wrongfully detains the
same;
[a]nd shall present such pleadings to a judge of the supreme court, a judge of
the circuit court, a chancellor, a county judge, a justice of the peace or other
duly elected judge, such judge shall issue an order directing the clerk of such
court to issue a writ of replevin for the seizure of the property described in said
declaration, upon the plaintiff posting a good and valid replevin bond in favor
of the defendant for double the value of the property as alleged in the declaration, conditioned to pay any damages arising from the wrongful seizure of said
property by the plaintiff ....
Miss. Code Ann. § 11-37-101 (West Supp. 1988).
103 Wyatt. 710 F. Supp. at 181. The district court held that the statute violated due
process because it denied judges the discretion to deny a writ after being presented with
a clerk's order. Id.; accord Johnson v. American Credit Co. of Georgia, 581 F.2d 526 (5th
Cir. 1978); see also North Georgia Finishing Corp. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601 (1975);
Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972), reh'g denied, 409 U.S. 402, and reh'g.denied sub nom.
Parham v. Cortese, 409 U.S. 902 (1972); Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp. of Bay View, 395
U.S. 337 (1969); Turner v. Colonial Fin. Corp., 467 F.2d 202 (5th Cir. 1982).
104 710 F. Supp. at 182.
105 The Fifth Circuit previously held that:
a § 1983 defendant who had invoked an attachment statute is entitled to an immunity from monetary liability so long as he neither knew nor reasonably should
have known that the statute was unconstitutional.
Folsom Inv. Co. v. Moore, 681 F.2d 1032, 1037 (5th Cir. Unit A 1982).
106 710 F. Supp. at 182.
107 928 F.2d at 719. Three years after Lugar, the Supreme Court held that "denial of
a claim of immunity, to the extent that it turns on a question of law," is an appealable
collateral order, as defined by Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541
(1949). See also Mitchell %.Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 530 (1985).
108 928 F.2d at 720-21.
109 See 112 S. Ct. at 1836 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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laws." ' The Court extended to Cole and Robbins the good faith
affirmative defense of qualified immunity, barring damages resulting from the acts of private parties prior to the statute being declared unconstitutional."'
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine "whether
private persons, who conspire with state officials to violate constitutional rights, have available the good faith immunity applicable to3
public officials."". The Court reversed on a narrower issue,"
holding that defendants charged under section 1983 for invoking
state replevin, garnishment and attachment statutes later found to
be unconstitutional are not protected by objective qualified
4
immunity."
The Supreme Court built its decision, as it had since Tenney v.
Brandhove,"5 on the twin pillars of history and public policy. The
Court analyzed history the same way it had since Owen v. City of
Independence,"' inferring from the silence of the Forty-second
Congress that the legislators intended section 1983 to be subject
only to those immunities "so firmly rooted in the common law
and [I supported by such strong policy reasons that 'Congress
would have specifically so provided had it wished to abolish the

110 928 F.2d at 721. The Fifth Circuit stated what it considered to be a source of
private party immunity:
[t]he private party who invokes a presumptively valid attachment law is not entitied to immunity because the officer executing it is. Rather, quite independently,
the private party is 6ntitled to immunity because of the important public interest
permitting ordinary citizens to rely on presumptively valid state laws, in shielding
citizens from monetary damages when they reasonably resort to the legal process
later held to be unconstitutional, and in protecting a private citizen from liability when his role in any unconstitutional action is marginal.
Id.
The Court explained that the responsibility for unconstitutional laws:
rests [first] with the legislative body enacting the statute. The next line of responsibility rests with enforcing officials. When the legislature has not repealed.
and executive and judicial officials are still enforcing a statute, it is not unreasonable for private actors to fail to quickly comprehend a developing body of
doctrine that portends trouble for its constitutionality.
Id. at 722.
111 Id.
112 112 S. Ct. at 1834.
113 "[W]hether qualified immunity, as enunciated by Harlow . . . is available for private defendants faced with § 1983 liability for invoking a state replevin, garnishment or
attachment statute." Id.
114 Id.
115 341 U.S. 367 (1951). See supra notes 35-42 and accompanying text.
116 445 U.S. 622 (1980).
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doctrine.""" The Court considered Wyatt's section 1983 claim
most analogous to the 1871 torts of malicious prosecution and
abuse of process."' Since these torts allowed no immunities for
private defendants at common law, the Wyatt Court denied immunity to Cole and Robbins."9
The Court based its policy arguments, as it had in Harlow,2 '
on society's interest in freeing public officials to discharge their
duties vigorously without fear of reprisal. Since this interest was
not a concern with private parties, the immediately-appealable
qualified immunity granted public officials in Harlow was denied to
private parties.' Since Harlow changed the good faith affirmative
defense to an immunity, the Court restricted itself to granting
either an objective and immediately appealable immunity or nothing. 22 Because the rationales mandating qualified immunity for
public officials were not found applicable to private parties, 2
the Court granted nothing. It did, however, preserve the possibility
that Cole and Robbins could rely on an affirmative defense of
good faith, stating that it "did not foreclose the possibility" that
private parties facing liability under Lugar.
could be entitled to an affirmative defense based on good faith
and/or probable cause or that §, 1983 suits against private,
rather than governmental, parties could require plaintiffs to
carry additional burdens. 24 ,
Justice Kennedy concurred but, like the dissent, believed that
the Court should focus more on the "historical analogy, based on
the existence of common-law rules in 1871" than on the policy
concerns unique to government officials. 25 He did not wish to
extend Harlow, which:

117 112 S. Ct. at 1831 (quoting Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 555 (1967)).
118 Id.
119 Id. at 1832. This Note criticizes the Court's historical analysis. See infra Part IV.A.
120 Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1981).
121 112 S. Ct. at 1832-33.
122 Id. at 1832.
123 The Court recognized qualified immunity for government officials "where it was
necessary to preserve their ability to serve the public good or to ensure that talented
candidates were not deterred by the threat of damage suits from entering public services." Id. at 1833. The Court did not find this rationale transferable to private parties, but
failed to consider if other equally important public policies existed that are specific to
private parties. See infra Part IV.B.
124 Id. at 1834.
125 Id. at 1835 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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completely reformulated qualified immunity along principles
not at all embodied in the common law, replacing the inquiry
into subjective malice ... with the objective inquiry into the
legal reasonableness of the official action. 2 '
Kennedy did not find sufficient evidence in the common law to
support an extension of qualified immunity to private parties.'2 7
Justices Rehnquist, Souter, and Thomas dissented. Chief Justice Rehnquist, analyzing history, rejected the majority's characterization of the common law as providing a defense because in
1871 the plaintiff carried the burden of proving that the defendant accused of malicious prosecution or abuse of process acted
with malice and without probable cause.' 28 The Chief Justice interpreted precedent as establishing a good faith defense for public
officers at common law, and saw no historical basis for denying
objective immunity to private parties. 9
He argued that public policy concerns favor the extension of
objective qualified immunity to private individuals who rely on
state statutes. The Chief Justice dissented because the majority
punished "private citizens who rely unsuspectingly on state laws
they did not create and may have no reason to believe are invalid.'
He considered it axiomatic that "society will be benefitted
if private parties rely on [] law to provide them a remedy, rather
than turning to some form of private, and perhaps -lawless, relief."'3 1
IV.

CRITICISMS OF THE WYATT RATIONALE

The Wyatt Court rested its refusal to extend good-faith immunity to private individuals on the twin pillars of historical analysis

126

Id. (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 645 (1987)).

127 Justice Kennedy warned that "[b]y casting the rule as an immunity, [the court]
impl[ies] that the underlying conduct was unlawful, a most debatable proposition in a
case where a private citizen may have acted in good-faith reliance upon a statute." Id.
128 Id. at 1838 n.1 (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting).
129 Chief Justice Rehnquist thought that "the general recognition under state law that
public officers were entitled to a good faith defense was sufficient to support the recognition of a § 1983 immunity" should be extended to include private citizens in the absence
of compelling historical or policy concerns. Id. at 1838.
130 Id. at 1833. Circuit judges agree with Rehnquist after Wyatt. See infra Part V.
131 Id. at 1839.
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and public policy.' This Part criticizes the Wyatt majority's consideration of these two factors. It argues that the deciiion produces inequitable results by holding private parties to a higher standard of care than their government counterparts.
A.

Historical Arguments

1. Old Tort Law
The Wyatt Court denied private parties good-faith immunity in
part by arguing that, since the Forty-second Congress did not discuss immunity issues while enacting the Civil Rights Act of 1871,
judges could consider only those immunities "so firmly rooted in
the common law and []. supported by such strong policy reasons
that 'Congress would have specifically so provided had it wished to
abolish the doctrine."""3 Then the Court left open the possibility
that private parties could escape liability with "an affirmative defense based on good faith and/or probable cause or that § 1983
suits against private, rather than governmental, parties could require plaintiffs to carry additional burdens."'3 4 Although this possibility would provide relief to private parties who rely on laws in
good faith and with probable cause, it would force these defendants to prove what had been elements of the offense to be pled
and proven by the plaintiff in 1871.' 'The Wyatt majority did
not justify this shift in the burden of proof.
Before reversing, the Supreme Court responded to the Fifth
Circuit's reasons for extending qualified immunity to Cole. 6
132 The Court found that "the reasons for recognizing an immunity (are] based not
simply on the basis of a good-faith defense at common law, but on special policy concerns involved in suing government officials." Id. at 1832. In addition, Rehnquist noted
that the Court recognized immunity in two circumstances: when common law provide
immunities at the time the Civil Rights Act of 1871 was adopted and when important
public policies suggested a need for an immunity. Id. at 1837; see also PETER H. ScHucK,
SUING GOVERNMENT: CITIZEN REMEDIES FOR OFFICIAL WRONGS 203-04 (1983).

133 Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 637 (1980) (quoting Pierson v. Ray,
386 U.S. 547, 555 (1967)). See also Wyat 112 S. Ct. at 1831 (repeating that "we infer
from legislative silence that Congress did not wish to abrogate such immunities").
134 Id. at 1834. On remand, the Fifth Circuit held that, absent a showing of malice.
private parties are not accountable for acts prior to a declaration that the ex parte prejudgment statute invoked was unconstitutional. Wyatt v. Cole, 994 F.2d 1113, 1121 (5th
Cir.). cert.
denied, 114 S. Ct. 470 (1993).
The Court called on the circuits to flesh out the contours of the new good faith
affirmative defense. Id. at 1834, 1837, 1838; see also CHENIERINSKY, supra note 29, § 8.6.
135 See infra notes 140-44 and accompanying text.
136 Wyatt v. Cole, 928 F.2d 718 (5th Cir.), reh'g denied, 934 F.2d 1263 (5th Cir.), cert.
granted, 112 S. Ct. 47 (1991), rev'd, 112 S. Ct. 1827 (1992).

NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 69:4

The two courts agreed that Cole's invocation of Mississippi's attachment statute most closely corresponded to the 1871 torts of
abuse of process and malicious prosecution."' But the Supreme
Court disagreed with the Fifth Circuit on two grounds. First, it
denied that a court could "'transform a common law defense
extant at the time of § 1983's passage into an immunity.' ". s Second, it rejected the Fifth Circuit's assertion that "'Congress in
to liability
enacting § 1983 could not have intended to subject
39
those who in good faith resorted to legal process."
Although reasonable minds could differ on these two issues;
the Supreme Court erred in characterizing probable cause and the
absence of malice as defenses in 1871. When the Forty-second
Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act in 1871, both malice and
the absence of probable cause were considered elements of the
torts of malicious prosecution and abuse of process which had to
be pled and proven by the plaintiff. Justice O'Connor, writing for
the majority, cited treatises by Thomas Cooley and Joel Bishop to
and
But both Bishop'
support her historical analysis."
Cooley"' classified malice and the absence of probable cause as

137 Compare Folsom Inv. Co. v. Moore, 681 F.2d 1032, 1037 (5th Cir. Unit A 1982)
with Wyatt, 112 S. Ct. at 1831.
138 112 S. Ct. at 1831 (quoting Folsom Inv. Co., 681 F.2d at 1038).
139 Id. In dissent, Chief Justice Rehnquist recorded the views he shared with the Fifth
Circuit, but which failed to carry the day:
[tihe normal presumption that attaches to any law is that society will be benefitted if private parties rely on the law to provide them a remedy, rather than
turning to some private, and perhaps lawless, relief.. . . I would have thought
it beyond peradventure that there is a strong public interest in encouraging
private citizens to rely on valid state laws of which they have no reason to doubt
the validity.
Id. at 1839-40.
140 Id. at 1831 (citing THOMAS M. COOLEY, LAW OF TORTS 187-90 (1879); JOEL P.
BISHOP, COMMENTARIES ON NON-CONTRACT LAW §§ 228-250, § 490 (1889)).
141 Bishop wrote:
Malicious prosecution is the putting in motion of any process of the law. and
the carrying of it forward until it terminates in favor of the one prosecuted,
maliciously and without reasonable or probable cause, to his injury, in respect to
either of personal security or property.

§ 221 (1889). Bishop
characterizes a malicious prosecution action as the proper remedy for abuse of process
claims. Id. § 224. "There must be malice and the want of probable cause combining.
And these must be affirmatively shown by the plaintiff." Id. § 225.
142 Cooley similarly thought malicious prosecution actions required the plaintiff to
show that:
1. A suit or proceeding has been instituted without probable cause therefor.

JOEL PRENTISS BISHOP, COMMENTARIES ON THE NON-CONTRACT LAW
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elements of the offense. Other prominent legal commentators
agree, including James Barr Ames'1 3 and Francis Hilliard.'
The majority recognized that:
[o]ne could reasonably infer from the fact that a plaintiff's
malicious prosecution or abuse of process action failed if she
could not affirmatively establish both malice and want of probable cause that plaintiffs bringing an analogous suit under §
1983 should be required to make a similar showing to sustain a
§ 1988 cause of action."'
This is precisely what the Wyatt majority should have inferred if
they valued history as a genuine concern. The Court did not state
that elements of the offense resemble absolute immunity more
than either qualified immunity or the new good faith defense.
Late nineteenth century tort law dictates a choice between absolute and qualified immunity, not one between qualified immunity
and the good faith defense which, presumably, would not be open
to interlocutory appeal.
The Court may have conducted a less than rigorous historical
inquiry because it felt bound by Harlow."' As already explained,
the Harlow Court removed the subjective component of qualified
immunity for public officials operating within the scope of their
authority defense because it consumed too many judicial resources, hindered the vigorous exercise of discretion by government
officials, and was inconsistent with the notion that "insubstantial
claims should not proceed to trial." 4 ' Although these public policies do not transfer to private parties, different public policies

2. The motive in instituting it was malicious.
3. The prosecution has terminated in the acquittal or discharge of the accused.
THOMAS M. COOLEY, LAW OF TORTS 181 (1880).
Like Bishop, Cooley thought that a plaintiff must prove both a subjective and objective standard. Id. at 184-85. He asserted that "suing out an attachment for an amount
greatly in excess of the debt" qualified as abuse of process. Id. at 189.
143 JAMES BARR AMES & JEREMIAH SMrTH, A SELECTION OF CASES ON THE LAW OF

TORTS 548-61, 568-71 (2d ed. 1893).
144 "[T]he plaintiff must allege and prove . . . that [the prosecution] was instituted
maalidously, and without probable caus not merely falsely." FRANCIS HILLIARD, 1 LAW OF
TORTS 437 (1874).
Hilliard asserted that "[ilf an attorney, from malicious motives procure from justices
of the peace an unauthorized order of attachment, operating injuriously upon the
defendant's rights, he is liable as well as his client." Id. at 439.
145 Wyatt v. Cole, 112 S. Ct. 1827, 1833 n.2 (1992).
146 See Lagos, supra note 27, at 873-78.
147 Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 815-16 (1982).
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support immunity for private parties, rendering the choice between granting either objective qualified immunity or nothing a
false dichotomy. The Wyatt Court should have applied to private
parties the scrutiny it undertook on behalf of public officials before arriving at its decision in Harlow. Had it done so, the Court
may have realized that although these policies do not apply to
private parties, others did, and granted qualified immunity to private parties.
2.

The Scope of the Fourteenth Amendment

The Civil Rights Act of 1871148 was passed "for the express
purpose of 'enforc[ing] the Provisions of the Fourteenth
Amendment."""9 The Court has long recognized that the Fourteenth Amendment offers no shield against private conduct, "'however discriminatory or wrongful."" 5 Private-party defendants in
section 1983 suits should face no more liability than their public
counterparts would in similar actions.
The Lugar Court stated two prerequisites to ensure that acts
by private parties were "fairly attributable" to the state.'5 First,
the deprivation in question must be caused by some right created
by the state, some rule imposed by the state, or some person for
whom the state is responsible.'52 Second, the private party must
be fairly said to be a state actor because he acted together with or
obtained significant aid from state officials, or his conduct is otherwise attributable to the state.' 5 The Court imposed these re-

148 Civil Rights Act of 1871, § 1, 17 Stat. 13 (1871).
149 Lynch v. Household Fin. Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 545, reh'g denied, 406 U.S. 911
(1972) (quoting the Civil Rights Act of 1871, § 1).
The Fourteenth Amendment provides that:
[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law; nor deny any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection
of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.

150 Drawing upon The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883),
highlighted:

the Supreme Court

the essential dichotomy set forth in [the Fourteenth] Amendment between deprivation by the State, subject to scrutiny under its provisions, and private conduct,
'however discriminatory or wrongful,' against which the Fourteenth Amendment
offers no shield.
Jackson
151
152
153

v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 349 (1974).
Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 456 U.S. 922, 936 (1982).
Id.
Id.
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quirements to keep private parties from "fac[ing] constitutional
litigation whenever they seek to rely on some state rule governing
their interactions with the community surrounding them. " " As it
had in Lugar, the Court should have balanced the purpose of section 1983 with the limited scope of the Fourteenth Amendment.'55
By freeing only government officials from insubstantial section
1983 suits on summary judgment, the Wyatt Court declared, in
effect, that innocent private parties who rely on presumptively
valid statutes should be held accountable to a higher level of expertise than the government officers who create and enforce the
statutes. 5 Holding private parties to a higher level of expertise
than public officials runs counter to section 1983, which was intended to uphold individual rights from state actions, not the acts
of other individuals.'5 7 Granting qualified immunity to private individuals who act in good faith and in the absence of malice
would eliminate this injustice, while at the same distinguishing
between those who rely unsuspectingly on laws later judged unconstitutional and those who manipulate them.
B.

Public Policy Analysis

In addition to its odd reading of history, the Wyatt Court
selected biased policy arguments. When it held that qualified immunity should not be extended to private parties, it included in
its analysis only those public policies unique to public officials. 8
The Court shied away from private-party immunity in part because
the public policies entitling government officials to qualified immunity in Harlow were not applicable to private individuals.'59

154 Id.
155 The historic purpose of § 1983 was to prevent state officials from using the cloak
of their authority under state law to violate rights protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 172 (1961), overruled by Monell v. Department of
Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
156 It is remarkable that Justice O'Connor, who wrote the majority opinion in Wyatt,
previously joined the Lugar dissent in arguing that § 1983 private liability under the twropart test went beyond the scope of the Fourteenth Ainendment. Lugar, 457 U.S. at 947.
157 Carey v. Piphus, 112 S. Ct. 1827, 1829 (1993); see also Wyatt v. Cole, 928 F.2d
718, 721 (5th Cir.), cert. granted, 112 S. CL 47 (1991), revd, 112 S. Ct. 1827 (1992).
158 112 S.Ct. 1827, 1839 (1992) (Rehnquist, CJ. dissenting).
159 When considering immunity for public officials, the Court struck a familiar chord.
It repeated that:
where it is necessary to preserve their ability to serve the public good or to
ensure that talented candidates were not deterred by the threat of damage suits
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This reasoning is flawed. Just because those public policies unique
to public officials do not apply to private parties, it does not follow that no equally compelling public policies exist favoring a
grant of qualified immunity to private individuals. The Court
should have considered policies supporting qualified immunity for
private citizens." These policies include supporting a citizen's
right to rely on laws, reducing litigation costs, and promoting the
performance of quasi-public duties.
1. The Right to Rely on Laws
A citizen's right to rely on the validity of their laws is inherent in the concept of an ordered society. 6 ' Chief Justice
Rehnquist and the Fifth Circuit argued for that right to no
avail.'62 While it is true that "[t]he resolution of immunity questions inherently requires a balance between the evils inevitable in
any available alternative,"'63 the right to rely should be weighed
in the balance, as Justice Powell argued in Lugar.The Wyatt majority ignored this basic right. Just as society benefits when government officials perform their legitimate duties without fear of suit,
so, too, should private citizens and businesses be able to rely on
presumptively valid laws.
Restricting immunity to public officials creates disincentives by
making lawless self-help more attractive in the sense that private
citizens can escape section 1983 liability by avoiding the legal
system." 4 Although the Wyatt Court asserted that its decision

from entering the public service.
Id. at 1833.
160 Id. The Wyatt majority thought it faced a choice between objective Harlow immunity or nothing. Instead. it should have "balance[d] the evils inevitable in any available
alternative." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 813-14 (1982).
161 See generally H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (1961).
162 As the Fifth Circuit stated:
The private party who invokes a presumptively valid attachment law is not entitled to immunity because the officer executing it is. Rather, quite independently,
the private party is entitled to immunity because of the important public interest
permitting ordinary citizens to rely on presumptively valid state laws . . . and in
protecting a private citizen from liability when his role in any unconstitutional
action is marginal.
Wyatt v. Cole, 928 F.2d at 721; see also 112 S. Ct. at 1839-40 (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting).
163 Harlow. 457 U.S. at 813-14. The Wyatt majority realized that "[qlualified immunity
strikes a balance between compensating those who have been injured by official conduct
and protecting the government's ability to perform traditional functions." Wyatt, 112 S.
Ct. at 1833.
164 Id.
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would not unduly impair public policy,'65 it undermined the presumption that "society will be benefitted if private parties rely on
that law to provide them a remedy, rather than turning to some
form of private, and perhaps lawless, relief."' Wyatt admonishes
private citizens who invoke the legal system that they act at their
peril.
Principles of equality and fairness suggest that "private citizens
who rely unsuspectingly on state laws they did not create and may
have no reason to believe are invalid should have some protection
from liability, as do their government counterparts." 67 While
finding this argument unpersuasive in Wyatt," the Court applied
these principles in Lugar, noting that it "avoids imposing on the
State, its agencies or officials, responsibility for conduct for which
they cannot fairly be blamed."
Courts should not deny private
parties the same immunity as public officials "simply because the
private parties are not [government] employees." 7 ' In part, private parties should have the same protection as their government
counterparts because no deterrence results from punishing individuals who are unaware that their acts were wrongful.'

165
166

Id.
Chief Justice Rehnquist argued that:

The normal presumption that attaches to any law is that society will be benefitted if private parties rely on the law to provide them a remedy, rather than
turning to some private; and perhaps lawless, relief. . . . I would have thought
it beyond peradventure that there is a strong public interest in encouraging
private citizens to rely on valid state laws of which they have no reason to doubt
the validity.
Id. at 1839-40.
167 Id. at 1833. See Jones v. Preuit & Mauldin, 851 F.2d 1321, 1325 (lth Cir. 1988)
(en banc) (asserting that when a citizen utilizes state law, "he should do so with confidence that he need not fear liability resulting from the legislature's constitutional error"),
vacated on other grounds, 489 U.S. 1002 (1989); Folsom Inv. Co., Inc. v. Moore, 681 F.2d
1032, 1037-38 (5th Cir. Unit A 1982) (stating that public policy justifications for immunity protecting a private citizen who relies on presumptively valid state statute "alone justify
an immunity").
168 112 S. Ct. at 1833.
169 Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 923, 936 (1982).
170 112 S. Ct. at 1840 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
171 As the Eleventh Circuit stated:
[qualified immunity] preserves the full deterrent force of section 1983 by excluding from liability only those who could not reasonably have known that their
conduct violated the federal constitution. No additional deterrence can be
achieved by punishing individuals who could not reasonably have known that
their actions were improper.
Preuit & Mauldin, 851 F.2d at 1325.
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Litigation Costs

By refusing to extend qualified immunity to private defendants, Wyatt increases litigation costs for private parties who are
unaware that the statutes upon which they rely will later be declared unconstitutional." 2 The Supreme Court has long recognized that litigation costs present a significant public policy concern." 3 The good-faith affirmative defense requires the absence
of malice and, therefore, must be submitted to a fact-finder. PostHarlow qualified immunity, on the other hand, involves only the
objective standard of probable cause, which is a question of law
amenable to summary disposition. 4 The Wyatt Court thought
early dismissals were less important to private defendants than
their public counterparts, who exercised discretion. Both the promotion of quasi-public duties and a citizen's right to rely on laws
oppose the Court's view.
Private parties generally have less access to costly legal resources than their public counterparts. The Wyatt Court recognized that objective Harlow immunity "acts to safeguard government, and thereby protect the public at large, not to benefit its
agents."'75 Private taxpayers usually provide some means for public officials to secure legal advice, allowing officials to assess the
validity of laws on which they might rely. Citizens do not share
this advantage and, therefore, should not be held to a higher
standard than their public counterparts. If the Court wants to
impose higher litigation costs on private parties in section 1983 actions, it should assert more important public interests to justify the
additional burden.
3.

Quasi-Public Duties
After summarizing the public policies stated in Harlow,'76 the

172 See supra note 68.
173 See 112 S. Ct. at 1839 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); Anderson v. Creighton, 483
U.S. 635 (1987); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 813-14 (1982).
174 112 S. Ct. at 1839 (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting).
175 Id. at 1833.
176 The Harlow court noted the factors to consider before recognizing qualified immunity:
[t]he resolution of the immunity question inherently requires a balance between
the evils inevitable in any available alternative . . . . [I]tcannot be disputed
seriously that claims frequently run against the innocent as well as the guilty-at
a cost not only to the defendant officials, but to society as a whole. These social
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Wyatt Court repeated that qualified immunity should protect defendants where "necessary to preserve their ability to serve the
public good or to ensure that talented candidates were not deterred by the threat of damage suits from entering public service."'7 7 The Wyatt Court's application of the Harlow rationale
fails, however, to allow for situations where private parties are obligated, by contract or otherwise, to perform quasi-public functions
indistinguishable from those of their governmental counterparts. 78 The Lugar Court focused on state action, not state employment, as the controlling factor for liability.'79 To be consistent with Lugar, the Wyatt Court should have granted good faith
immunity to private individuals.
V. A NEW CIRCUIT SPLIT
The Supreme Court granted certiorari 8 ' in Wyatt to resolve
the circuit split 8' over "whether private defendants threatened
with 42 U.S.C. § 1983 liability are, like certain government officials, entitled to qualified immunity from suit."8 2 Yet two years
after the Wyatt decision, the courts of appeals still differ over its
proper breadth and application. This absence of uniformity is
understandable. The circuits do not know whether they should

costs include the expenses of litigation, the diversion of official energy from
pressing public issues, and the deterrence of able citizens from acceptance of
public office. Finally, there is a danger that fear of being sued will dampen the
ardor of all but the most resolute, or the most irresponsible [government officials], in the unflinching discharge of their duties . . . . In identifying qualified
immunity as the best attainable accommodation of competing values . .
we
relied on the assumption that this standard would permit "[i]nsubstantial law
suits [to] be quickly terminated."
457 U.S. at 813-14.
177 112 S. Ct. at 1833.
178 See Charles W. Thomas, Resolving the Problem of Qualified Immunity for Private Defendants in Section 1983 and Bivens Damage Suits, 53 LA. L. REV. 449 (1992). After Tlyat.
Professor Thomas was concerned that courts may not grant private correctional employees
the same immunities as their government counterparts. Id. He urged courts to consider
that the government contracted with the private sector for services traditionally provided
through public agencies only to devise more efficient and effective means of public service. Id.
179 Lugar, 457 U.S. at 935. See also Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312 (1981)
(finding no state action existed in a § 1983 action against a public defender); Adickes v.
S.H. Kress and Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970) (establishing the active party conspiracy requirement to recognize private party liability).
180 112 S. Ct. 47 (1991).
181 See snl/
a notes 18-25.
182 112 S. Ct. 1827, 1829 (1992).
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restrict Wyatt to cases involving states replevin, garnishment or attachment statutes, or apply the case to broader issues.18 Far
from deciding the immunity issue, Wyatt left another circuit split
in its wake. The Fifth,'84 Eighth," and Ninth'86 Circuits applied the Wyatt decision to deny qualified immunity to private
parties outside the context of replevin, garnishment, or attachment
Tenth,"u and Eleventh.8 9 Circuits
statutes. The Seventh,8
have at least considered, either in holdings or dicta, the possibility
of extending qualified immunity to private defendants beyond the
context of replevin, attachment, or garnishment statutes. The First,
Second, Third,19 ° Sixth, 9' and D.C. Circuits have not addressed
private-party immunity after Wyatt. The Fourth Circuit has not addressed the private immunity issue beyond a replevin, garnishment

183 The Wyatt majority recognized that certiorari was granted to determine "[w]hether
private persons, who conspire with state officials to violate constitutional rights, have available the good faith immunity applicable to public officials." Id. at 1834. In the next
sentence, the majority restricts the scope inquiry to "whether qualified immunity, as enunciated by Harlow . . . is available for private defendants faced with § 1983 liability for
invoking a state replevin, garnishment or attachment statute." Id.
Justice Kennedy defined the issdie as "whether private defendants in § 1983 suits are
entitled to the same qualified immunity applicable to public officials . . . which of course
would be subject to the objective standard of Harlow." Id. at 1837 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
184 Williams v. City of Luling, 802 F. Supp. 1518 (W.D. Tex. 1992), dismissed, 12 F.3d
209 (5th Cir. 1993) (interpreting Wyatt to deny qualified immunity to a private defendant
accused of conspiring with police to deny the plaintiffs constitutional right to be free
from unlawful arrest). See Wyatt v. Cole, 944 F.2d 1113 (5th Cir.), cert. denied. 114 S. Ct.
470 (1993); see also Batiste v. Colonial Sugars, Inc., 1993 WL 149067. *3 (E.D. La. 1993)
(responding to the possibility of a good faith defense by remarking that "the precise
parameters of the Wyatt decision are not clear").
185 Dorothy J. v. Little Rock School Dist., 794 F. Supp. 1405 (E.D. Ark. 1992), afd,
7 F.3d 729 (8th Cir. 1993) (interpreting Wyatt to deny qualified immunity to a private
social service agency accused of depriving the plaintiff of his right to personal integrity
and security under the Fourteenth Amendment).
186 Penman v. Korper, 977 F.2d 590, 1992 WL 276462 (9th Cir. 1992) (stating that,
after Wyatt, "the law is settled that private parties are not entitled to qualified immunity
in [1983] actions").
187 Sherman v. Four County Counseling Ctr., 987 F.2d 397 (7th Cir. 1993) (granting
qualified immunity to a private hospital which was ordered by the state court to detain
the plaintiff against his will).
188 Moore v. Wyoming Medical Ctr., 825 F. Supp. 1531 (D. Wyo. 1993) (recognizing
the possibility of qualified immunity for private defendants under contract with the government). '
189 Burrell v. Board of Trustees of Ga. Military College, 970 F.2d 785 (lth Cir.),
reh'g denied, 978 F.2d 718 (lth Cir. 1992) (recognizing the possibility of extending qualified immunity for private defendants under contract with the government or under a
court order), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1814 (1993).
190 Danley v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 808 F. Supp. 399 (M.D. Penn. 1992).
191 Watts v. Burkhart, 978 F.2d 269 (6th Cir. 1992).
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92
or attachment situation.1

The Wyatt Court failed to account for public policies favoring
the extension of qualified immunity to private parties who act in
good faith and without malice.'
Although it is too soon to determine the full impact of Wyatt," 4 the Seventh,'95 Tenth' 9
and Eleventh' 9 Circuits already have acknowledged policy reasons for extending qualified immunity to private defendants in
section 1983 actions.'
Society benefits from reducing litigation
costs, promoting quasi-public duties, and allowing citizens to rely
on duly enacted laws. These public policies persist despite being
ignored by the majority in Wyatt. They resurface in most post-Wyatt
cases and, until reckoned with, they will aggravate the resurgent

circuit split.
Burrell v. Board of Trustees of Georgia Military College

9

demon-

strates the confusion among the circuits over the scope of the
Wyatt decision. Burrell alleged that' she was fired in retaliation for
her criticisms of Georgia Military College.2 ° The Eleventh Circuit

192 Kennedy v. Widdowson. 804 F. Supp. 737 (D. Md. 1992).
193 See supra Parts III and IV.B.
194 See supra Part III.
195 Sherman v. Four County Counseling Ctr., 987 F.2d 397 (7th Cir. 1993) (extending qualified immunity to a private mental hospital that treated an involuntary mental
patient as instructed by a court order).
196 Moore v. Wyoming Medical Center, 825 F. Supp. 1531 (D. Wyo. 1993) (recognizing the possibility of qualified immunity for private defendants under contract with the
government).
197 Burrell v. Board of Trustees of Georgia Military College, 970 F.2d 785, 795 (11th
Cir.), reh'g denied, 978 F.2d 718 (l1l Cir. 1992), cert. denied. 113 S. Ct. 1814 (1993) (citing Frazier v. Bailey, 957 F.2d 920 (1st Cir. 1992)); Rodruguies v. Furtado, 950 F.2d 805
(Ist Cir. 1991); DeVargas v. Mason & Hanger-Silas Mason Co.. 844 F.2d 714 (10th Cir.
1988), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1074 (1991)).
198 See supra notes 158-60 and accompanying text.
199 970 F.2d 785 (l1th Cir. 1992).
200 Melba Burrell was dismissed from her job as Senior Vice President of First Federal Savings and Loan Association of Milledgeville. She filed a section 1983 and 1985(3)
suit against James Baugh, the mayor and chairman of the Board of Trustees, Jacob
Goldstein, member of the Board of Trustees and Director of First Federal, Alva Baggarly,
Director and C.E.O. of the savings and loan, and the aldermen of Milledgeville, in both
their individual and official capacities, alleging that she was fired in retaliation for her
criticisms of the Georgia Military College. 970 F.2d at 786.
Baugh, Goldstein, and Baggarly claimed qualified immunity and moved for summary
judgment, which the district court denied. Id. at 787.. The Eleventh Circuit reversed the
denial on the § 1983 claim. Id. It affirmed the denial as to the § 1985(3) conspiracy
claims because public officials cannot claim qualified immunity from § 1985(3) conspiracy
violations. Id. at 793, 794 n.21. Interestingly, although the case lacked compelling quasipublic duties or a court order, the court acknowledged such duties or mandates as possible factors to be considered. Id. at 795-96 (citihg Duncan v. Peck, 844 F.2d 1261, 1264
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reversed the district court's denial of the trustees' claim to qualified immunity in their official capacities.2"' Drawing upon
Rehnquist's reasoning in the Wyatt dissent,2 2 the court held qualified immunity was not available to defendants who, in their individual capacities, "acted in concert with public officials for the sole
purpose of violating another's constitutional rights."" 3 When
faced with the broader issues upon which the Wyatt Court initially
granted certiorari,2"4 the Eleventh Circuit read Wyatt as narrowly
as possible, stating that it "need not diagnose the current vitality
of court of appeals decisions0 5 allowing private defendants to assert qualified immunity in non-attachment cases.1 20 5 This construction would not have been possible if the Wyatt Court stuck to
its original agenda.
Sherman v. Four County Counseling Cente' 0 ' documents that
federal judges will continue to grant qualified immunity to private
parties who assume quasi-public duties.0 ' Sherman brought a section 1983 action after he was detained and treated against his will
by Four County Counseling Center, a private psychiatric hospital

(6th Cir. 1988)). But the lack of guidance by the Wyatt court on this issue lurked. See
supra notes 184-98 and accompanying text.
201 970 F.2d at 789 n.10. The court assumed that the defendants were public officials. Id. at 789. It cited its earlier reasoning in Parker v. Williams, 862 F.2d 1471, 1476
n.4 (l1th Cir. 1989) (stating that "suits against an individual in his or her official capacity are suits against the entity the individual represents"), arguing that since Milledgeville
and First Federal were not entitled to either qualified or Eleventh Amendment immunity
from § 1983. neither were their representatives. Id.
202 The Eleventh Circuit cited without question Rehnquist's notion that we should
not punish "private citizens who rely unsuspectingly on state laws they did not create and
have no reason to believe are invalid." 970 F.2d at 796 (quoting Wyatt, 112 S. Ct. at
1833 (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting)). The extension of qualified immunity to private individuals who act in good faith and in the absence of malice would promote reliance upon
laws.
203 Id.
204 See supra note 183.
205 See, e.g., Jones v. Preuit & Mauldin, 851 F.2d 1321, 1323-24 (11th Cir. 1988) (en
banc), vacated on other grounds, 489 U.S. 1002 (1989); Buller v. Buecher, 706 F.2d 844,
850-53 (8th Cir. 1983); Folsom Inv. Co. v. Moore, 681 F.2d 1032, 1036-38 (5th Cir. Unit
A 1982).
206 970 F.2d at 795.
207 987 F.2d 397 (7th Cir. 1993).
208 Although the Wyatt Court held only that defendants charged with invoking state
replevin, garnishment and attachments statutes later found to be unconstitutional are not
protected by qualified immunity, Wyatt v. Cole, 112 S. Ct. 1827, 1834 (1992), one could
read that decision and reasonably conclude that granting qualified immunity to any private party opens the door to a risk of reversal. 987 F.2d at 408-10.
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acting under court order."° The district court had dismissed
Sherman's claims against all defendants based upon absolute or
qualified immunity."'
The Wyatt majority put the Eleventh Circuit in a bind by
arguing that promoting the vigorous exercise of discretion by
public officials provided the rationale for extending qualified immunity to public officials while denying it to private parties. The
Eleventh Circuit realized that Wyatt produced inequity by treating
similar things differently. Under the vigorous exercise rationale,
Four County was exposed to liability for complying with a court
order, while Logansport State Hospital remained immune for
providing substantially similar services." The Sherman court affirmed the extension of qualified immunity to the private hospital,
arguing that any other decision would create disincentives:
We refuse to give private hospitals the Hobson's choice of
obeying a court's order directing discretional medical treatment, and facing liability for the resulting medical judgment,
or refusing to make a medical judgment, and exposing hospital
staff and patients to the risk of harm posed by a, potentially
violent mental patient.'
Four County Counseling Center served the public by accepting
and caring for mental patient committed by the state on an emergency basis. If private hospitals suffered exposure to liability under

209 After arresting Paul Sherman for criminal harassment, Indiana State Police Officer
Gary Boyles filed an application for emergency detention with the Cass County Superior
Court. The court authorized officers to take Sherman to the Four County Counseling
Center "to be detained, examined and given . . . emergency treatment." Id. at 399. Four
County doctors determined that Sherman was a chronic paranoid schizophrenic, detained
him, and reported as much to the court. Based on this report, Judge Cox ordered Four
County to continue to treat Sherman "as necessary and appropriate, with or without the
consent of the respondent." Id. Judge Cox later ordered Four County to transfer
Sherman to Logansport State Hospital, where Sherman remained until his preliminary
hearing.
At the hearing, Judge Cox determined that Sherman's involuntary commitment was
not warranted. Id. Sherman sued Officer Boyles, Judge Cox, Cass County, Four County,
and his Public Defender under § 1983, but voluntarily withdrew his claim against
Logansport State Hospital. Id.
210 Id.
211 Id. at 405. The court of appeals noted that Sherman never alleged that Four
County acted in bad faith or with malice. Id. The court compared private hospitals with
school board members. Id. at 406 (citing Wyatt, 112 S. Ct. at 1833-34). See Wood v.
Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 319 (1975) (stating that denial of qualified immunity to school
officials "'would contribute not to principled and fearless decision-making but to
intimidation'") (quoting Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967)).
212 987 F.2d at 406.
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section 1983 for accepting involuntary patients, they may refuse
these patients in the future, increasing the load for already overburdened state public hospitals." 3 Aside from these practical concerns, private hospitals should be able to rely on mandates handed
down by their judicial system. The Wyatt Court placed the Eleventh Circuit in an awkward position by refusing to grant qualified
immunity to private parties who rely upon laws and legal mandates
in good faith and without malice.
Sherman has been distinguished. In the absence of a court
order mandating treatment, another federal court denied qualified
immunity to a private mental hospital that detained and treated a
patient against their will. In Moore v. Wyoming Medical Center,2" 4
the district court denied qualified immunity to the two paramedics
who delivered the plaintiff to a mental hospital against her will.
The court considered both Burrell and Sherman, deciding that
Burrell controlled because the paramedics were not operating under a court order when they detained Moore. This case may have
turned more on the paramedics' show of excessive force and calloused indifference than the lack of a court order. The court was
also well aware that Sherman "raised the specter of qualified immunity.121

Wyoming Medical Center performed quasi-public duties

under public mandate, since it contracted to perform public functions in its lease with the Natrona County." 6 A grant of qualified
immunity to private parties who act in good faith and without
malice, under the standard set forth in Wood v. Strickland, would
produce an appropriate result here, since the paramedics' immunity claim fails in the presence of malice.

213 The court marshalled further support for its decision from the fact that, in many
instances, admission to smaller hospitals benefits involuntary patients by allowing the patients to be evaluated close to home and family, minimizing the disruption of their lives.
Id. It supported the public interest in maximizing the number of facilities available for
the detention and treatment of the mentally ill by sheltering private facilities from liability for discretionary medical judgments made while under a court order. Id.
214 825 F. Supp. 1531 (D. Wyo. 1993).
Becky Moore, like Paul Sherman, was a schizophrenic forced into treatment at a
private hospital under their state's emergency detention statute. Id. at 1534-35. Unlike
Sherman, Moore challenged the constitutionality of the statute, but without success. Id. at
153640.
Although Moore denied it, her therapist asserted that she threatened to commit
suicide over the phone. Id. at 1534-35. It was not disputed that two paramedics entered
Moore's house while she showered and brought her to Wyoming Medical Center
handcuffed and naked. Id.
215 Id. at 1543 n.8.
216 Id. at 1544.
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The Fifth Circuit minimized the post-Wyatt confusion present
in all circuits to varying degrees. It declared Wyatt unclear2 7 be218
fore applying the decision outside of an attachment context.
On remand, in Wyatt v. Cole,219 the Fifth Circuit focused on the

possibility that Cole and Robbins:
could be entitled to an affirmative defense based ori good faith
and/or probable cause or that § 1983 suits against private,
rather than governmental, parties could require plaintiffs to
carry additional burdens."0
It declined to recognize liability "absent a showing of malice and
evidence that [defendants] either knew or should have known of
the statute's constitutional infirmity." 22 ' Functionally, this approaches the standard set in Wood, which required both a subjective inquiry to assess malice and an objective good faith that encompassed "knowledge of the basic unquestioned constitutional
rights" 222

as set forth in "settled, indisputable law."223 This set of

objective and subjective hurdles best tests those who wish to escape liability while offering the advantage of providing a uniform
standard to both private and public parties.
VII.

CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court has not mended the circuit split that
emerged after Lugar. The courts of appeals are divided over the
scope of the Wyatt decision and its application to private parties
threatened with section 1983 liability for assuming quasi-public
duties. Sherman illustrates that Wyatt created a reluctance among
some federal judges to classify those performing quasi-public duties
as private parties. These jurists face the additional dilemma of addressing the undefined scope of the Wyatt decision and fleshing
out the contours of the new good faith defense alluded to in
Wyatt. The Court could have prevented this uncertainty by

217 Batiste v. Colonial Sugars, Inc., 1993 WL 149067, *3 (E.D. La. 1993).
218 Williams v. City of Luling, 802 F. Supp. 1518 (W.D. Tex. 1992), dismissed, 12 F.3d
209 (5th Cir. 1993) (denying qualified immunity to a private defendant accused of con
spiring with police to arrest another with malice and without probable cause).
219 994 F.2d 1113 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 470 (1993).
220 Id. at 1115 (quoting Wyatt v. Cole, 112 S. Ct. 1827, 1834 (1992)).
221 Id. at 1120. This approach is historically accurate in that, in 1871, the' plaintiff
carried the burden of proof for malice in abuse of process and malicious prosecution
actions. See supra notes 14044 and accompanying text.
222 Wood -'. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 322 (1975).
223 Id. at 321-22.
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granting to private parties the qualified immunity defined in Wood.
The Wood Court conferred qualified immunity to state actors
who remain within the dictates of settled, undisputed constitutional law in the absence of malice. It provided a uniform standard by
which to assess what the Court had earlier purported to be functional equivalents: representatives of the state and those who
should be treated as if they represent the state. It distinguished
between those who rely in good faith upon laws and those who
exploit them. We should return to the Wood standard. Public
officials are state actors in a way that private citizens never are. If
the Supreme Court decides to expose private parties to civil liability under section 1983, a statute intended to hobble public officials, it should treat private and public parties similarly. The Wyatt
decision holds citizens to a higher level of expertise than their
better-informed government officials, producing inequitable results.
These results have yielded higher litigation costs, lowered the
incentives for private parties to assume quasi-public duties, and
tested the public's willingness to work within their legal system. A
return to pre-Harlow parity would eliminate these problems.
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